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Western powers often turn to international sanctions in order to exert pressure on incumbent governments and signal
their support for the opposition. Yet whether, and through what mechanisms, sanctions trigger protest remains unclear.
We argue that sanction threats work as an international stamp of approval for would-be protesters; they encourage collec-
tive action against governments. Moreover, sanction threats send particularly clear and coherent signals if multiple senders
issue them and if they focus on human rights, which makes such sanctions threats more effective in sparking social unrest.
Using count models of protest activity, we find strong support for our arguments. We corroborate our findings with qualita-
tive evidence from the case of Zimbabwe.
Introduction
The Arab Spring revived scholarly and public interest in
the drivers of mass protest against governments (see
Beinin and Vairel 2013). Both recent developments and
past research suggest that external support emboldens
protesters (Kriesi 2004; Schock 2004, 142–72). This makes
international sanctions a key foreign policy tool for stop-
ping the suppression of internal opposition and, more
generally, for instigating democratization abroad (von
Soest and Wahman 2015). Yet, almost all studies on social
movements and collective action ignore the possible role
of sanctions in stimulating protest in targeted regimes
(for an exception, see Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).
However, scholars repeatedly identify internal oppos-
ition as a key factor influencing the effectiveness of inter-
national sanctions. Sanctions may increase previously
existing dissent within the targeted regime (Wallensteen
2000, 126; Weiss 1999, 502). They may also create new op-
position to the regime by mobilizing dissatisfied—but pre-
viously uncommitted and passive—elements of the popu-
lation (Blanchard and Ripsman 1999; Kaempfer and
Lowenberg 1999, 48–51). In a nutshell, protest activity ap-
pears to increase in sanctioned regimes (Allen 2008).
The connection between economic sanctions and in-
ternal dissent remains puzzling. According to the “punish-
ment theory” (Lektzian and Souva 2007, 850), sanctions’
economic harm directly translates into political pressure; de-
privation induces citizens to challenge the regime. However,
international sanctions also sparked antigovernment protest
before, or without, hurting the targeted country’s economy
(Arya 2008, 37–38; Blanchard and Ripsman 1999, 245).
In this article, we move beyond deprivation-based ex-
planations of protest in regimes under sanctions. We
argue that the messages of regime disapproval—and op-
position support—conveyed by sanctions provide the key
mechanism through which sanctions encourage protest.
Sanction threats create perceived opportunities for pro-
testers, because they constitute an international stamp of
approval for antiregime activity. We disentangle the signal-
ing dimension of economic sanctions from their eco-
nomic consequences by focusing on the stage in which
outside powers threaten, but have yet to implement, sanc-
tions. If sanctions increase mobilization against the re-
gime via signaling mechanisms, rather than by increasing
economic deprivation, then increasing protest activity
should occur at this stage.
We combine the new version of the Threats and
Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) dataset (Morgan, Bapat,
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and Kobayashi 2014) and the Mass Mobilization dataset
(Clark and Regan 2016) to test our expectations via mod-
els of protest counts. Our results demonstrate that sanc-
tion threats, rather than imposed sanctions, increase the
probability of antigovernment protests. In addition, we
present a nuanced picture, highlighting the disparate con-
sequences of different types of threats. Sanction threats
send particularly credible signals that encourage domestic
dissent if they (1) refer to human rights violations or (2)
come from multiple senders. Narrative evidence from
Zimbabwe illustrates the causal mechanisms postulated in
our theoretical argument and confirms the findings of the
statistical analysis. Sanction threats against President
Mugabe increased the perceived opportunity for voicing dis-
sent, thereby driving a wave of protests even in the face of
likely repression.
Overall, our theoretical approach integrates work on so-
cial movements, particularly antigovernment protest, with
sanctions scholarship. In doing so, we move away from the
predominant focus on state actors that currently prevails
in sanctions research. Our analysis also provides new in-
sights into the broader question—in both international
relations and comparative politics research—of how exter-
nal factors influence the domestic politics of states
(Gourevitch 1978; Levitsky and Way 2006).
The Sanctions–Protest Nexus
Traditional theories of protest suggest that a sense of
(relative) deprivation motivates citizens to lash out at the
government (Gurr 1970). Accordingly, socioeconomic
downturns relate positively to the mobilization of dissent
(see Urdal and Hoelscher 2012). This approach suggests
that sanctions prompt protest activity by inflicting eco-
nomic hardship on the population. The targeted society
acquiesces to the deprivation caused by economic sanc-
tions only up to a certain threshold, above which it reacts
with antigovernment protest (Kerr and Gaisford 1994).
Numerous sanctions scholars, therefore, use the economic
pain inflicted upon the target to predict the effectiveness
of international sanctions (Drury 1998; Hufbaueret al.
2007).
Yet such deprivation-based explanations fail to fully ac-
count for the link between sanctions and domestic pro-
test. Overall, economic dislocation following economic
sanctions rarely correlates with antigovernment protest
(Allen 2008). Sanctions that do not affect the society as a
whole—for example, financial restrictions targeted at the
leadership—appear to inspire antigovernment behavior to
the same extent as more painful measures (Selden 1999).
Moreover, sanctions sparked antigovernment protest prior
to or without hurting the targeted country economically.
For example, student demonstrations in Nepal spiraled
into large-scale antigovernment protest before India’s eco-
nomic sanctions could impose hardship on the popula-
tion (Blanchard and Ripsman 1999). Similarly, sanctions
against South Africa gave heart to anti-apartheid activists
even though the regime mitigated their financial impact
(Arya 2008; Crawford and Klotz 1999).
Our theoretical argument builds on an existing strand
of literature that links third-party advocacy to domestic dy-
namics of contention. In addition to creating deprivation,
sanctions send signals that may influence citizens’ deci-
sions to engage in collective action. Signals from third
parties can drastically alter organizers’ calculations of the
challenges to and opportunities for staging a protest at
home. Several case studies indicate that signals conveyed
by sanctions encourage dissent (see Baldwin 1985, 193;
Crawford and Klotz 1999). Research on international
human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
shows that these organizations create attention and offer
support for protesters (Risse and Ropp 1999). As a result,
NGO activities increase domestic antigovernment protest
(Murdie and Bhasin 2011).
Our argument differs from these studies. Instead of
examining tangible commitments to a domestic popula-
tion, we contend that signals of outside support provided by
sanctions often suffice to increase domestic protest. For ex-
ample, US sanctions against the Dominican Republic under
Trujillo encouraged the internal opposition to intensify
their fight against the authoritarian government (Kirshner
1997, 56). In Rhodesia, the resistance movement likewise
felt that sanctions validated their fight against the Ian
Smith government (Baldwin 1985, 193). At the most basic
level, international sanctions communicate the sending
states’ disapproval of targeted governments’ policies, imply-
ing support for the opposition. The US and European sanc-
tions on Burma in 2007 following the military government’s
brutal repression of large-scale demonstrations, for in-
stance, constituted “a show of international support for the
protesters and a strong symbolic condemnation of the re-
gime” (Wood 2008, 489). Sanctions reassure the oppos-
ition, even though they may not lead to concrete interven-
tions on behalf of the opposition. The perceived possibility
of success or the usefulness of their activity influences citi-
zens’ decision to engage in collective action (Ginkel and
Smith 1999). Sanctions influence these perceived opportu-
nities for voicing and enacting dissent in two ways.
First, sanctions show that the international community
takes note of a certain situation. International signals of
support for domestic dissent draw attention to norm-
violating states. This process empowers and mobilizes pro-
testers by establishing that an international audience exists
for their demands (Risse and Sikkink 1999). “Movement
activists are media junkies” who care deeply about media
reporting (Gamson 1995, 85). News coverage shapes their
perception of opportunities and risks. International
human rights NGOs often actively seek the attention of
foreign powers to support their cause (Murdie and Peksen
2014). Such attention works as a “stamp of approval,” sug-
gesting to (potential) protesters that the international
community supports the antiregime activity.
Second, international sanctions enable opposition
movements to mobilize domestically, because they point
to a potential ally. Sanctions signal to opposition groups
that other states seek policy change from the target
(Peksen and Drury 2010). Antiregime activists regularly in-
terpret third-party advocacy as providing additional legit-
imacy for their demands and activity (Della Porta and
Diani 2006, 223; Schock 2004; Stephan and Chenoweth
2008). International sanctions that convey signals of disap-
proval of the regime and support for the opposition lead
dissident groups to see themselves as more powerful and
leaders as more vulnerable. As a result, they influence dis-
senters’ strategic calculations. We contend that external
support strengthens potential protesters in regimes under
sanctions and reinforces their morale (Arya 2008; Hovi,
Huseby, and Sprinz 2005; Nossal 1989).
Perceptions of opportunity created by sanction signals
may even trigger collective protest in the absence of struc-
tural conditions favorable to collective action (see Peksen
and Drury 2010). For instance, citizens took to the streets
in Iran in 1977, because they saw greater opportunities for
successful protest than before, even though the Shah
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regime was in no way more vulnerable (Kurzman 1996).
For signals of opposition support to reach the (potential)
protesters, however, the targeted regimes must be
characterized by a minimum degree of political
openness (Meyer and Minkoff 2004) and, particularly,
by freedom of the press (Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003).
International sanctions shock domestic politics, funda-
mentally changing the potential protesters’ perceived
room to maneuver. As described above, this shift in per-
ceived opportunity could stem from the material impact
of sanctions, or from the intangible signal of outside sup-
port to the opposition. Empirically, disentangling the sig-
naling impact of sanctions from their potential depriv-
ation dimension is difficult. Threatened sanctions,
though, offer a means of exploring the effect of messages
in isolation from deprivation. Threats, by their nature,
send a signal without imposing immediate hardship on
the broader population.
In contrast, imposed sanctions may trigger countervail-
ing processes. By inflicting hardship on the society as a
whole, they can prompt a “rally-’round-the-flag effect,” if
the ruling elite manages to stoke nationalist feelings
(Allen 2005; Galtung 1967; Wood 2008). This effect in-
creases with the financial damage inflicted upon civilians
(Tostensen and Bull 2002, 376). In addition, the ruling
elite may prevent key constituencies from voicing dissent
by shifting economic pressure from support groups to pol-
itical opponents (inter alia Escriba-Folch and Wright
2010). Former president Milosevic employed such a strat-
egy in Yugoslavia in the 1990s when he made access to
sanction rents contingent on support for the regime
(Woodward 1995). Finally, regimes often use sanctions as
scapegoats for political and economic problems (Allen
2005; Nincic 2005). This strategy undermines opposition
mobilization against the status quo. Rally-’round-the-flag
effects, the strategic reallocation of resources to the disad-
vantage of opposition actors, and blame shifting counter-
act the signals sent by sanctions. Thus, we argue that, in
contrast to sanction threats, imposed economic sanctions
generally do not trigger increased collective action against
governments.
This discussion leads to the following testable hypotheses:
H1: Threats of sanctions increase protest activity.
H2: Imposed sanctions do not increase protest activity.
Disaggregating Sanction Threats
Thus far we have discussed economic sanctions as a uniform
tool of policy. Sanctions, however, differ widely in their
goals and implementation. We draw upon research on the
signaling dimension of sanctions (Giumelli 2011; Crawford
and Klotz 1999), as well as on framing and social move-
ments (Benford and Snow 2000), to identify heterogeneity
in the mobilizing power of sanctions signals. The clarity, co-
herence, and credibility of the threat affect the strength of
sanctions’ “communication factor” (Doxey 1972, 535) and
shape behavioral outcomes (Peterson 2013).
As Western nations increased their advocacy for democ-
racy after the end of the Cold War, an increased readiness to
react to human rights violations globally followed (Jentleson
2000). Sanctions that explicitly aim to improve the level of
human rights protection may also open up the potential for
increased political rights through democratization
(Davenport and Armstrong 2004; von Soest and Wahman
2015). The general effectiveness of such human rights sanc-
tions is contested (Drury and Li 2006; Peksen 2009). They
can, nevertheless, convey particularly strong signs of disap-
proval, because they explicitly demand changes to state–so-
ciety relations in targeted regimes. Measures specifically
issued because of human rights violations provide clearer
signals for domestic protesters, as they correspond to de-
mands for rights and protections.1 They relate more coher-
ently to protest goals, and clearly express a salient cause.
Second, we expect sanction threats to exert a stronger
impact if multiple senders issue them. Policymakers and
scholars alike suggest that larger coalitions of states send
particularly strong and credible signals to targeted re-
gimes (Bapat and Morgan 2009, 1075; Martin 1993, 431).
This contrasts with earlier findings, using the Hufbauer
et al. (2007) dataset, that unilateral sanctions are more
likely to succeed than multilateral ones (Miers and
Morgan 2002). Other studies conclude that the bargain-
ing and enforcement advantages of international organ-
izations eliminate this counterintuitive finding (Drezner
2000; Drury 1998). Newer research establishes that sanc-
tions success becomes more likely as international cooper-
ation increases, even without institutionalization (Bapat
and Morgan 2009; McLean and Whang 2010).
Thus, we propose two additional hypotheses regarding
the effect of different types of economic sanctions:
H3: Human-rights-related sanction threats are more likely to
increase protest activity than threats connected to other
demands.
H4: Multi-sender sanction threats are more likely to increase
protest activity than other sanction threats.
Research Design
We construct a dataset of country-months from 1990 to
2005. It includes information about ongoing and new
sanctions from the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions
(TIES) dataset, version 4 (Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi
2014). For the occurrence of protest activity, we consult
the Mass Mobilization dataset, phase 2 (Clark and Regan
2016). This new resource contains information on antigo-
vernment protests and regime responses in Latin
America, the Middle East and North Africa, Asia, and the
Americas (excluding the United States).2 The dataset
holds distinct advantages over other, commonly used data-
sets on antigovernment protest. It provides more detailed
information at a finer temporal grain than the Cross-
National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks and Wilson
2012). Moreover, its spatial coverage is broader than the
Social Conflict in Africa Dataset (Salehyan et al. 2012).
The case illustration on Zimbabwe presented later shows
that the mechanisms identified in the quantitative analysis
also apply to other world regions. The data allow us to
establish the temporal ordering so vital to our claim that
threats prompt domestic responses. Below, we discuss the
construction of the base dataset and the dependent variable,
before turning to the independent and control variables.
1On the related issue of democratic sanctions, see von Soest and Wahman
(2015).
2This data includes any event with 50 or more people who make a demand
against the state, either peacefully or using violence. Armed resistance (for ex-
ample, a rebel attack) is not included.
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Modeling Change in Protest Activity
Our dataset leverages the most fine-grained information
available. This constitutes a contribution to the study of the
domestic consequences of foreign intervention. Previous
work on sanctions and civil dissent utilized protest data
aggregated to the annual level. This limitation required
scholars both to discount any protests occurring in the same
year as a sanctions imposition and to assume an enduring
ability of sanctions to provoke domestic unrest.
Furthermore, the studies could not account for the potential
effect of the threat stage on domestic unrest. Our fine-
grained data strategy sidesteps these issues by offering a bet-
ter defense against four threats to validity: measurement
error, simultaneity bias, spuriousness, and endogeneity.
It is unlikely that every protest event observed in our sam-
ple stems from sanction threats and/or the imposition of
sanctions. To count every protest in the month or year of a
threat would risk introducing a substantial amount of meas-
urement error and simultaneity bias. We guard against both
threats by carefully lining up the dates of sanctions with the
dates of reported protest events. First, we converted the TIES
and the Mass Mobilization datasets to episode-months.
Second, we coded whether protest events took place before
or after a new threat or imposition of sanctions occurred.
Third, we allowed only protests that followed the threat or im-
position to contribute to counts of protest activity when
aggregating this data to country-months. For example, if a
country threatened another one with sanctions on November
15, we did not allow a protest event from November 10 to
count toward our calculation of change in protest level in
November. An event on November 17, however, would
count. In sum, carefully lining up extremely fine-grained
data enables us to develop a model that captures more pre-
cisely whether protest events follow sanction threats.
This strategy also allows us to guard against potential
spuriousness in our analyses. An episode of political violence
may cause both the threat of sanctions and an increase in
protest activity. If common, this coincidence could pose a
threat to the validity of inference regarding the effect of
sanctions on protest increases. The relative paucity of fine-
grained data on human rights violations, political scandals,
and other potential confounders makes this a tricky issue to
control for. However, we employ the best available variables:
an indicator for recent atrocities taking place within the
country (Ulfelder and Schrodt 2009), as well as an indicator
for increased use of violence against protesters in the previ-
ous month (Clark and Regan 2016). Atrocities and violence
against protesters exemplify the kind of events that trigger
both protests and sanctions. Controlling for these events
minimizes the risk of spurious correlation.3
In addition, our dataset provides a much better guard
against confounding variables than more temporally
aggregated data. Consider, for example, a generic cause
of spuriousness between sanctions (X) and protest
increase (Y), which we will call Z. This factor, Z, is posi-
tively, but imperfectly, related both to sanction threats
and to protests. Our data, then, will contain some observa-
tions where Z and Y occur with X, where the problem of
spuriousness is best illustrated. Because the international
community’s response rate to Z is imperfect, the data also
contain many instances where Z and Y occur absent X.
Recall that our measure of Y discounts all protests that
occur prior to X. This practice essentially advantages such
cases: if Z causes protest increase, then cases with Z¼ 1
and X¼ 0 should have higher values of Y overall than
cases where Z¼ 1 and X¼ 1. Unless the international
community responds very quickly and nearly every time
that Z occurs, our empirical strategy sets up a very hard
test for the effect of X. This reduces concerns about spuri-
ous causation in our analysis.
Related to this, endogeneity is a concern if the value
of Y in a previous time period affects the probability of
sanctioning. Specifically, a round of protests itself, or
the regime’s reaction to it, could prompt a threat of
sanctions. A positive relationship between threats of
sanctions and protest activity could partially stem from
serial autocorrelation in protest levels rather than from
the theorized signaling dynamic. However, our strategy
substantially limits this possibility in two ways compared
to annualized data. Working with monthly, rather than
yearly, data introduces more variation in the dependent
variable, which makes it less sticky over time. The prac-
tice of discounting protests that occur prior to the
threat or imposition creates an additional disruption in
any autocorrelation process.4 To further assuage con-
cerns, we also present a model with a lagged dependent
variable.
Our hypotheses focus on the probability of increases
in protest activity in response to sanction threats. We
tap into this concept using familiar count-model tech-
niques to capture variation in protest levels between
sanctioned and unsanctioned observations as well as
within cases over time. The monthly counts of protest
that we employ include a large proportion of zeros, as
well as some units where an antigovernment protest of
50 people or more—the criterion for the Mass
Mobilization dataset’s coding of a protest event—never
occurs. The count-model framework suggests two meth-
ods for dealing with unit heterogeneity and excess zeros
in count data: zero-inflated models and fixed effects es-
timators. Zero-inflated models estimate the probability
of a case falling into the all-zero population as well as
the effect of covariates on the expected count of pro-
tests. Fixed effects estimators, in contrast, leverage only
the within-case variation. They drop any countries that
lack variation in count over time and allow each remain-
ing unit its own unique intercept. We report results
from both models.5
Independent Variables: Threat and Imposition of Sanctions
We expect that threatened sanctions will affect the behav-
ior of protesters differently than imposed sanctions.
Threats rarely fall upon states not already under imposed
3Some recent papers utilize a measure of media attention to human rights
abuses as a control for spuriousness by way of identifying the visibility of a re-
gime’s bad behavior (Nielsen 2013; Peksen, Peterson, and Drury 2014). We
much prefer to control for recent use of violence and atrocities, for two rea-
sons. First, as both of our data sources use media searches to identify their
events, these occurrences are, by necessity, visible both internally and exter-
nally. Second, the available media attention variables code yearly variation in
coverage of human rights violations in the United States only. A measure that
would be constant across every one of our observations in every year could
perform better as a guard against spuriousness than indicators that capture
variation in regime behavior from month to month. To capture another rea-
sonable dimension of the visibility of regime behavior, though, we also include
measures of media freedom in the potential target states.
4See the online appendix for residual plots assessing the extent of any re-
maining autocorrelation.
5In the online appendix, we also present results from a bivariate probit
model with an equation for increase and decrease in protests. This method,
which produces results consistent with those of our main models, allows us to
entertain the possibility that covariates’ ability to provoke protest is not sym-
metrical with their potential to stifle protest. See Table A17 and Figure A9.
JULIA GRAUVOGEL, AMANDA A. LICHT, AND CHRISTIAN VON SOEST 89
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/61/1/86/2924814
by Institute of Asian Affairs user
on 15 December 2017
sanctions from a different party or regarding a different
issue. We code not only whether a new threat or a new im-
position takes place, but also whether other threats or
imposed sanctions are currently ongoing for each coun-
try-month.6 This produces indicator variables for new
threat, new imposition, other threats ongoing, and other impos-
itions ongoing.
As a foreign policy tool, economic sanctions address tar-
get behavior across a wide range of issues, from militariza-
tion and alliance behavior to tariff levels and environmen-
tal protections. Sanctions also take on different forms,
from the freezing of individuals’ assets to comprehensive
trade embargos (Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014).
Finally, different types of senders threaten (and imple-
ment) sanctions. We account for this heterogeneity across
sanction episodes in three ways. First, to test H3 and H4,
we control for human rights and multi-sender sanctions.
Indicators tag episodes that emerge over human rights
violations in the target state, or in cases with more than
one sender. Second, we separate sanctions that might
hurt the general population from those that target elites
(Tostensen and Bull 2002; Brooks 2002; Lektzian and
Souva 2007). The variable targeted denotes asset freezes
and travel bans. These indicators should be understood as
interactions with the other ongoing variables. They switch
on only in cases of ongoing imposition or threat and thus
allow sanctions episodes involving multiple senders,
human rights, or targeted measures to differ in effect.
Too few observations exist for separate effects to be reli-
ably estimated across types of new impositions/threats.
The third strategy we employ acknowledges the asserted
difference between trade-related sanctions—or what Pape
(1997) labels “trade wars”—and other types of sanctions
(see Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev 2009). Similarly, sanc-
tions leveled over environmental protection could have
less relevance for domestic contestation. We code a se-
cond slate of indicators for sanctioning activity that ex-
clude any new or ongoing sanctions about either trade or
environmental protection. These cases are identified
using the TIES issue variables.
Controls
We estimate models with a slate of controls that may affect
antigovernment protest. First, we tap into the opportunity
for protest and coordination via measures of regime type
and information availability. Previous research shows that
democracies, in general, are more likely to concede (inter
alia Allen 2005). Targeted sanctions such as asset freeze
and travel ban may work better against authoritarian lead-
ers (Brooks 2002; Lektzian and Souva 2007). Even more
importantly, the predicted likelihood of demonstrations
after the imposition of sanctions is smaller for authoritar-
ian and democratic regimes than for hybrid regimes
(Allen 2005). Accordingly, we model regime type using
polity2 and polity2 squared (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers
2014). We employ Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press
Index (FOTP) to proxy information availability (Freedom
House 2013), because signaling effectiveness depends on
freedom of speech and open media (Choi and James
2007). Specifically, we include indicators for their ratings
of “free” and “partly free,” leaving “not free” as a reference
category. Past studies showed that linkage—understood as
the density of ties and cross-border flows—increases the
prospects of external support (inter alia Levitsky and Way
2006). Hence, we include a measure of globalization and
openness in the form of Dreher, Gaston, and Martens’s
(2008) Overall Globalization Index. These variables tap
into both the plausibility and effectiveness of signaling
across national borders and domestic coordination
potential.
The cost of protest potentially constrains collective ac-
tion. State repression has strong repercussions for both
protest and sanction threats (inter alia DeNardo 1985).
Alternatively, state-sponsored violence against dissidents
may radicalize individuals and generate or facilitate large-
scale mobilization (Hess and Martin 2006). We measure
repression in two ways. First, the Physical Integrity scale
controls for general levels of repression in each state year
(Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). Second, we use
the Mass Mobilization dataset’s state response variable to
code indicators that summarize recent trends in the re-
gime’s treatment of protesters. Specifically, we calculate
the average number of violent or accommodative re-
sponses to protest in each month and code whether either
type of response increased or decreased relative to the
prior month.7
Finally, the capacities of citizens to mobilize, and of the
regime to suppress such mobilization, must be taken into
account. As regards the former, research on protest shows
that population size positively impacts mobilization (inter
alia Eisinger 1973). In addition, greater state capacity is
associated with lower levels of protest (inter alia
Cunningham 2013). We include the variables population
size and real gross domestic product, both lagged one
year and logarithmically transformed (Gleditsch 2002).
Results
Table 1 presents regression results for the monthly count
of antigovernment protests across an array of specifica-
tions. Column (1) gives the count portion of the zero-
inflated negative binomial. For clarity of presentation, the
results for the inflate equation can be found in the online
appendix. Columns (2) through (4) present coefficients
and robust standard errors for fixed effects Poisson mod-
els with slight variations.8 The second model controls for
country-fixed effects. The third introduces fixed effects
for the years that residuals analysis suggested may be un-
usual. The fourth model includes a lagged dependent
variable, which provides an additional buffer against serial
autocorrelation. As such a strategy may not be considered
appropriate in the fixed effects Poisson (see Cameron and
6Our data contain 62 country-months of threats against states not already
under sanction (see online appendix).
7The variable for increased violence against protesters was mentioned ear-
lier during our discussion of how the modeling strategy would address the
threat of spuriousness.
8In contrast to concerns that Poisson models are vulnerable to overdisper-
sion, which may be a problem in this data, Poisson fixed effects estimators
with robust standard errors are remarkably robust (see Cameron and Trivedi
2013, 341–57; Wooldridge 2010, 755–58). In particular, the alternative to
Poisson in this case would be the Negative Binomial distribution. This distribu-
tion, however, cannot be modified effectively for fixed effects estimation with-
out extremely unrealistic assumptions (see Allison and Waterman 2002;
Cameron and Trivedi 2013, 357–58; Guimaraes 2008). Readily available esti-
mators for “fixed effects Negative Binomial”—notably Stata’s xtnbreg com-
mand—are not truly fixed effects estimators (Allison and Waterman 2002;
Guimaraes 2008). Given the number of individual countries in our analysis
and the relatively short panel, the only viable alternative to the fixed effects
Poisson strategy—dummy variable negative binomial regression—may induce
an incidental parameters problem. The Poisson is one of the only distribu-
tions that is invulnerable to this problem (Cameron and Trivedi 2013, 353–55;
c.f. Allison and Waterman 2002; Greene 2004).
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Table 1. Regression Results for Monthly Count of Antigovernment Protest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Zero-inflated negative
binomial
Fixed effects (FE)
Poisson
FE Poisson w/time
dummies
FE Poisson w/lagged DV
New threat 0.465*** 0.206** 0.199** 0.205**
(0.134) (0.0851) (0.0871) (0.0831)
New imposition 0.034 0.097 0.090 0.064
(0.107) (0.126) (0.122) (0.114)
Human rights sanction 0.585** 0.188 0.217 0.172
(0.296) (0.241) (0.234) (0.239)
Targeted sanction 0.072 0.014 0.002 0.030
(0.137) (0.107) (0.095) (0.107)
Multisender sanction 0.147 0.678*** 0.658*** 0.663***
(0.182) (0.181) (0.162) (0.179)
Other threats ongoing 0.847*** 0.361* 0.333* 0.341*
(0.166) (0.191) (0.182) (0.185)
Other impositions ongoing 0.434* 0.581 0.542 0.582
(0.228) (0.388) (0.394) (0.386)
Overall globalization(t-12) 0.041*** 0.077*** 0.072*** 0.069***
(0.006) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021)
Polity2 0.035 0.145 0.121 0.113
(0.048) (0.101) (0.086) (0.092)
Polity2 squared 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.004
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Physical integrity 0.055 0.006 0.002 0.000
(0.046) (0.038) (0.031) (0.038)
FOTP Free 0.657*** 0.179 0.0355 0.166
(0.199) (0.161) (0.147) (0.154)
FOTP Partly free 0.123 0.200 0.0945 0.184
(0.107) (0.177) (0.172) (0.168)
Logged population(t-12) 0.563*** 0.669 1.295 0.384
(0.0702) (1.321) (1.509) (1.319)
Atrocity(t-1) 0.243* 0.051 0.083 0.045
(0.125) (0.047) (0.051) (0.047)
Increased state violence(t-1) 0.03 0.001 0.015 0.034
(0.092) (0.081) (0.067) (0.082)
Increased state accommodation(t-1) 0.071 0.093 0.091 0.091
(0.102) (0.093) (0.087) (0.086)
Decreased state violence(t-1) 0.161 0.015 0.051 0.028
(0.107) (0.144) (0.130) (0.137)
Decreased state accommodation(t-1) 0.264** 0.116 0.102 0.121
(0.134) (0.180) (0.176) (0.181)
Antigovernment protests(t-1) 0.015* 0.012*
(0.008) (0.006)
Constant 8.607***
(0.688)
Ln/Alpha 0.806***
(0.172)
Combined coefficients
Other threats þ Human rights 0.263 0.550* 0.550* 0.513*
(0.329) (0.307) (0.300) (0.306)
Other threats þ Targeted 0.776*** 0.348* 0.331 0.311
(0.245) (0.202) (0.197) (0.200)
Other threats þ Multisender 0.995*** 1.04*** .991*** 1.005***
(0.251) (0.255) (0.239) (0.25)
Other imposed þ Human rights 0.151 0.770 0.758 0.754
(0.477) (0.470) (0.471) (0.468)
Other imposed þ Targeted 0.362 0.568 0.539 0.552
(0.308) (0.383) (0.385) (0.38)
Other imposed þ Multisender 0.581* 1.26*** 1.200*** 1.245***
(0.301) (0.424) (0.419) (0.42)
Observations 12204 7968 7968 7968
Countries 73 47 47 47
2 Loglikelihood 6922 12453 12365 12405
Model v2 729.3 1098 1478 3428
Note: In all cases, reported standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered on country. The unit of observation is the country-month.
Fixed effects specifications necessarily omit all cases in which there is no variation in the dependent variable. The subscript t – 12 indicates, for
variables only available in yearly increments, a lag of one year; t – 1 indicates a lag of one month. Combined coefficients are calculated using
Stata’s lincom utility, which obtains standard error estimates via the Delta Method. See online appendix for further specifications and reporting,
including: inflate equation from the zero-inflated negative binomial, coefficients from dummy variables on selected years in Model 3, and a
dummy-variable Poisson for intercept estimates by country. ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.10.
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Trivedi 2013, 368–75), we consider the results of Model
(3) the most reliable.
The results remain remarkably similar across these
three specifications. None of our included covariates are
time invariant, but many move very rarely. When re-
stricted to within-case variation (i.e., in the fixed effects
models), few of the control variables achieve statistical sig-
nificance. The globalization indicator is positively related
to protest and statistically significant, which confirms the
importance of cross-border ties (Levitsky and Way 2006).
The inconsistent performance of all measures of state re-
pression—physical integrity score, atrocity, and the
monthly changes in violence—squares with previous re-
search, which indicates that repression may either inhibit
or encourage mobilization.9 Population size and free
media exert large positive effects in the zero-inflated
framework. However, they are extremely inefficient in
Models (2) through (4), where their impact is restricted
to describe the effect of changes within a country.10 This
is a general feature of fixed effects models, where loss of
data from comparisons between units of analysis is aban-
doned in order to increase confidence in control of unit
heterogeneity.
Despite the variation in modeling assumptions, our key
explanatory variable, new threats, performs as hypothe-
sized in all specifications. As suggested in H1 and H2,
threats of sanctions, not newly imposed sanctions, in-
crease antigovernment protests. All else being equal, a
new threat increases the incident rate of protests by 59
percent, compared to a case without threats looming.11
The relative difference in the probability of a nonzero
count for cases experiencing new threats or new impos-
itions versus those without new sanctions or threats pro-
vides another intuitively appealing confirmation of H1
and H2. Figure 1 presents the differences in probability
across a range of possible counts in the previous month.
The spikes in Figure 1 span the range between the 2.5th
and 97.5th value in a simulated sampling distribution of
100,000 estimated differences in probability. Black spikes
give the effect for new threats; gray, for new impositions.12
New threats exert a significantly positive effect, while new
imposed sanctions do not. The probability of a nonzero
count of protests increases by 1.22 percent even if the
prior month featured no such activity. If a single protest
occurred in the previous month, the effect of threats is
much larger, increasing the probability of some dissent by
over 32 percent.
In Models (2) through (4), which eliminate between-
unit differences, new threats still exert a positive and sig-
nificant effect. According to Model (3), a target hit with a
new threat will experience a 22 percent greater incidence
of dissent, all else constant. Even this very conservative
test supports H1 and H2. The findings regarding ongoing
sanctions episodes also support our signaling argument:
ongoing threats may also contribute to protest mobiliza-
tion. Though the results in the fixed effects models do
not reach the 5 percent threshold, the coefficient for on-
going threats is consistently sized across the specifications.
In Model (1), which allows differences between units to
contribute to the effect, ongoing threats appear to be very
destabilizing for the regime. These findings suggest that
Figure 1. Relative differences in predicted probability of nonzero count of antigovernment protests by new sanctions and
previous levels
Note: Spikes provide 95 percent credible intervals from simulated sampling distribution of 100,000 draws from the param-
eter matrices of the negative binomial reported as Model (1) in Table 1. The relative difference is the
Pr Y > 0jsanctionð Þ  Pr Y > 0j  sanctionð Þð Þ=PrðY > 0j  sanctionÞ.
9More details on the role of regime type are available in the Robustness
Check section below.
10See Table A1 in the online appendix for descriptive statistics, including
the within and between variance of each covariate.
11We calculated this quantity from Model (1). It is obtained by a simple
transformation of the coefficient into an incident rate ratio: eb  1  100:
The average marginal effect of new threats in this model is 0.40 (p < .001).
The marginal effect in this, as in most nonlinear models, depends on the
values of all other covariates. This figure was obtained via Stata’s margins com-
mand with the dydx() option, which averages over all the predicted marginal
effects and provides standard errors via the Delta Method.
12We obtained these figures and confidence bounds through a simulation
procedure, which took 100 draws of 1,000 vectors of coefficients from the vari-
ance–covariance matrix of the zero-inflated negative binomial.
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there may be some over-time trends in the effect of
threats, which should be investigated in future work.13
We include several variables to capture likely sources of
variation in the effect of sanctions. At the bottom of Table
1 we report the combined coefficients describing the ef-
fect of different types of ongoing threats or imposed sanc-
tions, which potentially exert varying impact on protest
(narrow sanctions/threats, multilateral sanctions/threats,
and human rights sanctions/threats). Since the human
rights and multi-sender indicators switch on only if there
is an ongoing sanction or threat, they represent inter-
action terms, allowing sanctions with these characteristics
to affect the outcome differently. The combined coeffi-
cients evaluate the conditional hypotheses about types of
sanctions/threats. The most consistent finding across our
specifications is the destabilizing effect of sanctions dis-
putes that involve more than one sender. Across all four
models, multi-sender threats contribute to a sizeable in-
crease in the count of protests, increasing the conditional
mean by about one unit. This result lends strong support
to H4, which predicts that multi-sender threats and sanc-
tions produce a bigger effect than unilateral ones, be-
cause they indicate a broader base of international sup-
port for the opposition. Moreover, the finding that multi-
sender sanctions raise the conditional mean by even more
than one unit when actually imposed strongly confirms
previous research (Bapat and Morgan 2009).
The results with respect to H3 are more mixed. In the
zero-inflated specification, the indicator for human rights
achieves significance, but with a negative sign. The com-
bined effects, though, do not reach statistical significance.
In our fixed effects specifications, ongoing human rights
threats exert a positive combined effect, but fall short of
the 5 percent confidence level. We believe this pattern of
findings makes sense, given that threats over human rights
abuses likely apply to those cases where protesters face
high barriers to dissent. Thus, in the model that relies par-
tially on between-unit variation, human rights sanctions
appear to “wash out,” and in the within-unit models, the
effect is weakly significant. Overall, we interpret the results
as modest evidence in favor of the extra signaling power
predicted in H3 for human-rights-related threats and
strong support for H4 with regard to multi-sender threats.
Our model also allows targeted sanctions to work dif-
ferently than others. The results for this variable vary
across model specification. This most likely means that
some systematic differences between countries faced
with targeted versus broad-based sanctions remain
uncontrolled for in Model (1). The fixed effects specifi-
cations, then, provide a safer inference of the extent to
which different types of ongoing sanctions episodes af-
fect protest levels.
Robustness Checks
As a guard against the charge that sanctions over trade
and environmental policy differ from others, we estimate
our models using an alternative operationalization of
sanctions. The results displayed in Table 2 exclude any
target that is exclusively sanctioned over trade or environ-
mental issues from the new and ongoing sanctions epi-
sodes. Clearly, our key finding—that new threats of
sanctions increase protest—remains remarkably robust
to this alternative conceptualization. The coefficient es-
timates for new threats are practically identical in the
fixed effects models, and very similar in the zero-
inflated model. The only notable change is that on-
going threats and impositions no longer achieve statis-
tical significance.14 The much larger proportion of on-
going sanctions and threats that were excluded by this
coding rule drives this result. Only 17 of the 251 new
threats in our sample stemmed from trade and environ-
mental disputes. The proportion of cases excluded for
ongoing threats and impositions was much higher, at 31
percent and 35 percent, respectively.
We also investigate the possibility of conditional effects
across regime types, because the ability of economic sanc-
tions to trigger domestic unrest could be mediated by the
relationship between the regime and the people.15 In par-
ticular, Allen (2008) finds an inverted-U relationship be-
tween regime type and protest. Accordingly, we separated
our data into three clusters—democracies, anocracies,
and autocracies—using conventional cut points of66 on
the polity2 scale to separate the pure regime types from
those in between. We then estimated our fixed effects
models in each subclass. Table 3 reports the results.
We uncover a phenomenon similar to, but more pro-
nounced than, the one noted by Allen (2008). New
threats markedly increase the incidence of dissent in
democracies and anocracies, by 30 percent and 81 per-
cent, respectively.16 In autocracies, however, we find a
Table 2. Regression Results for Monthly Count of Antigovernment Protest, Censoring Sanctions Episodes from Trade and Environmental
Disputes
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Zero-inflated negative binomial Fixed effects (FE) Poisson FE Poisson w/time dummies FE Poisson w/lagged DV
New threat 0.372*** 0.208*** 0.195*** 0.205***
(0.109) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062)
New imposition 0.011 0.088 0.078 0.053
(0.107) (0.128) (0.125) (0.117)
Human rights sanction 0.565* 0.580 0.592 0.551
(0.296) (0.394) (0.389) (0.386)
Note: Full results available in the online appendix, Tables A13 and A14. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
13Model (1) also reports a marginally significant finding for ongoing im-
positions. The complete eradication of this finding in the fixed effects models
suggests that it stems from between-case variation, and thus is more vulnerable
to spuriousness or endogeneity concerns than is the finding regarding on-
going threats.
14The model estimated is identical to that reported in Table 1, but for the
rules used to identify economic sanctions. Please see online appendix Tables
A13 and A14 for full reporting of this model. We show only the most pertin-
ent coefficients here.
15On the varying effectiveness of sanctions in destabilizing different types
of leaders, see Licht (2015).
16Readers unfamiliar with the economic sanctions data may believe that
sanctions against democracies are uncommon, or at least that “high politics”
issues will almost never escalate to the point of economic coercion against a
democratic target. This is not correct. In our sample, democracies are more
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significant decrease of 21 percent in the protest incident rate
following a new threat, all else constant. This finding could
stem from the difficulty of the threat being received in fully
closed systems (see also Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003).
It is also consistent with the use of protest-dampening re-
pression (Josua and Edel 2015; Davenport 1995). Sanctions
spark less repression against antiregime actors in democra-
cies than in autocracies (Peksen 2009). The finding for
new impositions in autocratic regimes defies our expect-
ations, indicating an increase in the incident rate.
Sanction Threats as Signals in the Zimbabwean Case
The sanctions episode in Zimbabwe illustrates how the sig-
nals conveyed by sanction threats create perceived opportu-
nities for regime-critical forces, stimulating domestic anti-
government protest. In addition to tracing the causal
mechanism, it demonstrates the applicability of the results
obtained in the quantitative analysis for a case located in a
region not covered by phase 2 of the Mass Mobilization
dataset. Sanctions were repeatedly threatened and later
imposed on Zimbabwe’s long-time ruler Mugabe and key
members of the government as well as on the ruling party,
ZANU–PF (Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic
Front), in response to widespread human rights violations.
The US Senate issued a highly publicized threat to im-
pose sanctions and subsequently passed the Zimbabwe
Democracy and Recovery Act (ZIDERA) on August 1,
2001. Likewise, the European Union issued various threats
regarding so-called restrictive measures on Zimbabwe.
That October, a meeting of ministers paved the way to
sanctions and subsequently specified that the potential
measures would include travel bans for the regime elite
and development aid cuts (BBC 2002). The EU imple-
mented sanctions on February 18, 2002.
The sanction threats led to increased antiregime activ-
ity. Regime-critical actors, spearheaded by the newly
founded Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), wel-
comed the initial threats and particularly the senders’ cau-
tions against further human rights abuses (Chan 2010,
46). Unlike previous opposition parties, the MDC felt that
it enjoyed the endorsement of the international commu-
nity. This signal of support bolstered the cohesion and de-
velopment of the Zimbabwean opposition forces (Alao
2012). Zimbabwe experienced an almost unprecedented
wave of mass action, including a countrywide strike in
2001 and numerous demonstrations in downtown Harare
and beyond throughout 2002 (Dansereau 2003).
Opposition actors envisioned international sanctions as
part of their “final push” strategy, during which the do-
mestic struggle would be complemented by external pres-
sure.17 The “opposition saw a glimmer of hope in sanc-
tions”18 at a time when the rigging of the 2002
presidential elections confirmed that the MDC was not
contesting ZANU-PF on a level playing field. Despite wide-
spread government repression, the signals of support sent
by repeated sanction threats increased the perceived op-
portunity for protest. This perception was partly tied to an
analogy made by the MDC between its struggle and that
of the ANC against apartheid. The MDC believed that
international sanctions against South Africa’s apartheid
regime helped the ANC gain political leverage and would
likewise create opportunities for the antiregime struggle
in Zimbabwe.19
Their nature made the international sanction threats
particularly clear and coherent signals to the MDC. First,
the senders explicitly referred to antigovernment pro-
testers. The EU voiced “its serious concern about the. . .in-
timidation of political opponents” (Council of the European
Union 2002, emphasis added). US criticism of Mugabe
also referred to the hard stance he had taken against the
MDC (Alao 2012, 184). In sum, the sanction threats sent
the unequivocal signal that the West would not tolerate
the shrinking of political space and that it was willing to
support the democratic forces inside the country. This
message served as an international stamp of approval for
the protesters. The MDC stressed that “the eyes of the
international community are still firmly fixed on Mugabe
and his illegitimate regime [and]. . .that their violent and
corrupt agenda is being documented and reacted to by
the wider international community” (allAfrica.com 2002,
emphasis added). These signals emboldened the MDC,
helping drive the wave of protests against Mugabe despite
serious threats of physical harm to individual protesters.
Second, these threats were issued by multiple senders
rather than just stemming from the former colonial power
Great Britain, in which case they could have been easily
discredited. Instead, threats to implement targeted meas-
ures were conveyed by the EU in its entirety, the United
States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Eriksson
2007).
Conclusion: Sanction Threats as an Inducement to
Domestic Protest
This article provides important insights into the connec-
tion between international sanctions, a key foreign policy
tool, and mass protest within the targeted country. It high-
lights the role of nongovernment actors in shaping the
political effects of sanctions. Most previous work incorpor-
ates domestic groups in one of two ways: there are helpless
victims who suffer the consequences of international sanc-
tions and domestic repression (for example Allen and
Table 3. Fixed Effects Poisson of Count of Antigovernment Protests,
Subsample Analysis by Regime Type
(9) (10) (11)
Democracies Anocracies Autocracies
New threat 0.260** 0.591*** 20.239***
(0.109) (0.148) (0.030)
New imposition 0.124 0.468*** 0.556***
(0.089) (0.131) (0.169)
Human rights sanction 0.508 0.032 0.506
(0.294) (0.350) (0.327)
Multisender sanction 1.209*** 0.255 0.134
(0.208) (0.500) (0.686)
Threats ongoing 0.309 0.329 0.245
(0.301) (0.432) (0.903)
Sanctions ongoing 1.295*** 0.552 1.169***
(0.331) (0.498) (0.331)
Note: Please see online appendix, Table A15, for full reporting of re-
sults by regime type. Regime types are operationalized using66 as cut
points on the Polity2 scale. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
likely to have sanctions ongoing than to be untargeted. If we censor cases ex-
clusively motivated by trade or environmental issues, we still see 35 percent of
democratic cases under sanction and 27 percent under threat. Furthermore,
our data contain 675 observations of human rights sanctions against demo-
cratic countries, including Israel, Haiti, Guatemala, Chile, India, Thailand,
and Indonesia.
17Interview, Harare, January 20, 2014.
18Interview, Harare, January 21, 2014.
19Interview, Harare, January 28, 2014.
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Lektzian 2013; Weiss 1999), and there are powerful inter-
ests already positioned to influence decisions and protect
themselves from the fallout (Morgan and Schwebach
1995). Instead, we treat protesters as political actors in
their own right. We present original evidence on the gen-
eral question of how external factors shape domestic pol-
itics and, more specifically, dissent within states
(Gourevitch 1978; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).
By signaling disapproval of the incumbent regime and
support for the opposition, sanction threats create per-
ceived opportunities that encourage collective dissent;
they constitute an international stamp of approval for the
protesters. Our results thus support the notion that sanc-
tion threats can succeed in inducing political change in
the target (Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005; Whang,
McLean, and Kuberski 2013). They also shed light on the
prior failure to find statistically significant relationships
between sanctions’ economic cost to the target and out-
comes such as leadership change (Allen 2008; Marinov
2005; Licht 2015).
We show that the effect of sanction threats increases
with clarity and consistency. First, sanction threats issued
by multiple senders convey stronger signals than those
that are only voiced by a single state. Second, we find
some evidence that sanctions regarding a regime’s human
rights violations, rather than some arcane issue of trade
law, imply stronger support for those critical of a regime.
Future research should aim for a more detailed under-
standing of the relationship between political protest in
the face of external sanction threats and in the period after
sanctions imposition. In this context, we need more infor-
mation on which societal groups protest against targeted
governments (see Allen 2008). We might also distinguish
between differing protest strategies. Past studies highlight
important differences between peaceful and violent protest
tactics (Dudouet 2013; Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Stephan
and Chenoweth 2008). We combined all types of oppos-
ition demonstrations. But scholars and policymakers alike
should be interested to learn how external attempts to ex-
ercise influence affect the propensity for peaceful, as
opposed to violent, reactions inside target states.
Most importantly, scholars need to unpack the dynamic
interaction of sanction threats and responses by the op-
position. In practical terms, the effects of new threats un-
fold over time. While some protests occur spontaneously,
many require careful planning and organization. This
means that would-be protesters on the ground require
time to respond to international developments.
Dissatisfaction with the regime may also build as the sanc-
tions episode continues without successful settlement,
which should potentially further reduce barriers to col-
lective action. These arguments suggest that the medium-
and long-term effects of threats vary in accordance with
their clarity, coherence, and credibility.
Moreover, our findings provide additional evidence
that sanctions undermine targeted governments. They are
particularly valuable in the fight against human rights vio-
lations abroad. Overall, sanction threats foster action by
would-be protesters—even in very adverse circumstances.
Policymakers should, therefore, distribute their signal of
regime disapproval widely—including through multiple
channels, such as social media. Doing so increases the
chances of the message reaching key target audiences.
In addition, states should redouble efforts to issue sanc-
tion threats with a unified voice. Protesters seem to per-
ceive coordinated threats that come from multiple
states as particularly credible signals of external support.
Our analysis also raises some questions about the efficacy
of economic sanctions once they have been imposed.
Sending states hoping to drum up domestic opposition
may need to take further actions after sanctions have
actually been imposed. Domestic civilian organizations
may need assistance to operate once their governments
begin scapegoating the states that have imposed sanctions
and allocating remaining resources to shore up their
position.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental information can be found at ISA Online.
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